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2 We construe Muhammad's complaint in the light most favorable to him, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true. We review the district court's 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Muhammad timely appealed the district court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of his Title VII claims and the denial of his motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.

Subsequently, the district court sua sponte reconsidered whether DCCSCD was Muhammad's Title VII employer, concluded that it was not, and dismissed Muhammad's complaint in its entirety. The district court then denied Muhammad's third motion to amend his complaint as futile since Muhammad had not filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge against the Dallas County District Judges.

The district court, however, denied DCCSCD's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Muhammad's Title VII claims because the court was unable to determine as a matter of law that DCCSCD was not Muhammad's Title VII employer. While Muhammad's third motion to amend his complaint was pending, the district court dismissed Muhammad's § 1981 and § 1988 claims, concluding that they were barred by sovereign immunity. In response to DCCSCD's motion, Muhammad moved the court for leave to amend his complaint for the third time so that he could add the Dallas County District Judges as defendants. According to DCCSCD, probation officers in Texas are employed by the district judges of the judicial district of their county, not by the county's community supervision and corrections department. 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing in part that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over Muhammad's § 1981 and § 1988 claims because they were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and (2) Muhammad failed to state a Title VII claim because DCCSCD was, as a matter of law, not his employer for Title VII purposes. In a second amended complaint, Muhammad expanded his Title VII retaliation claim to allege specifically that DCCSCD denied him a promotion and merit and step increases because he exercised his equal employment rights.ĭCCSCD filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. After learning that Dallas County was not his employer, Muhammad amended his complaint to name DCCSCD as the defendant. Muhammad later retained counsel to represent him in the matter. § 1988, alleging that it retaliated and discriminated against him based on his race by: (1) assigning him an unbearable workload, (2) forcing him to complete the work of non-black probation officers, and (3) reprimanding him when he was unable to complete the work.

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Muhammad had worked as a probation officer in Dallas County, Texas for fourteen years when, proceeding pro se, he sued Dallas County under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Because it has notīeen established as a matter of law that the DCCSCD was not Muhammad's employer, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. On appeal, Muhammad challenges that determination and the district court's refusal to grant leave to file a third amended complaint. 12(b)(6) because it concluded that in Texas a community supervision and corrections department is, as a matter of law, not a probation officer's Title VII employer. Ibn Zakariya Muhammad, a probation officer, sued Dallas County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (DCCSCD) for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1 and the district court dismissed those claims pursuant to FED. Ruth Ruggero Hughs (argued), Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.Īppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.īefore JOLLY, PRADO and OWEN, Circuit Judges. Muhammad (argued), The Muhammad Law Firm, Dallas, TX, for Muhammad. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 479 F.3d 377 Ibn Zakariya MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff-Appellant,ĭALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY SUPERVISION AND CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee.